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In this report we dene a probabilistic extension for a basic terminologi	
cal knowledge representation languages Two kinds of probabilistic state	
ments are introduced statements about conditional probabilities between
concepts and statements expressing uncertain knowledge about a specic
object The usual model	theoretic semantics for terminological logics are
extended to dene interpretations for the resulting probabilistic language
It is our main objective to nd an adequate modeling of the way the two
kinds of probabilistic knowledge are combined in what we call default
reasoning about probabilities Cross entropy minimization is a technique
that turns out to be a very promising tool towards achieving this end
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 Introduction
Terminological knowledge representation languages concept languages termino	
logical logics are used to describe hierarchies of concepts WS While the
expressive power of the various languages that have been dened eg KL	ONE
BS ALC SSS varies greatly in that they allow for more or less sophisti	
cated concept descriptions they all have one thing in common the hierarchies
described are purely qualitative ie only inclusion equality or disjointness rela	
tions between concepts can be expressed
In this paper we investigate an extension of terminological knowledge repre	
sentation languages that incorporate quantitative statements
Let us illustrate the use of quantitative statements by an example The follow	
ing is a simple knowledge base that could be formulated in any concept language
Example  
 
T	box Flying bird  Bird
Antarctic bird  Bird
A	box Opus  Bird
In this purely qualitative description a lot of information we may possess can	
not be expressed The two subconcepts of Bird that are specied for instance
are very dierent with regard to the degree by which they exhaust the supercon	
cept One would like to make this dierence explicit by stating relative weights
or conditional probabilities for concepts in a manner like
PFlying birdjBird   
PAntarctic birdjBird    
Also it may be desirable to express a degree by which the two concepts Antarc
tic bird and Flying bird which stand in no subconcept 	 superconcept relation
intersect
PFlying birdjAntarctic bird    
For the A	box apart from the certain knowledge Opus  Bird some uncertain
information may be available that we should be able to express as well There
may be strong evidence for example that Opus is in fact an antarctic bird Hence
POpus  Antarctic bird   
could be added to our knowledge base

It is important to realize that these two kinds of probabilistic statements are
of a completely dierent nature The former codies statistical information that
generally will be gained by observing a large number of individual objects and
checking their membership of the various concepts The latter expresses a degree
of uncertainty in our belief in a specic proposition Its value most often will be
justied only by a subjective assessment of likelihood
This dual use of the term probability has caused a lot of controversy over
what the true meaning of probability is a measure of frequency or of subjective
belief eg Jay A comprehensive study of both aspects of the term is
Car More recently Bacchus has developed a probabilistic extension of rst	
order logic that accomodates both notions of probability Bac
Now that we have stressed the dierences in assigning a probability to subsets
of a general concept on the one hand and to assertions about an individual
object on the other we are faced with the question of how these two notions of
probability interact how does a body of statistical information aect our beliefs
in assertions about an individual
Consider our example above here the given general conditional probabilities
enable us to give a reasonable estimate for the likelihood of Opus being a ying
bird As Opus is an antarctic bird with probability  and antarctic birds do y
with probability  we would argue that Opus ies with a probability of at least
 Reasoning somewhat more accurately the probability for Opus
being a ying non	antarctic bird will also be taken into account The inference
principle sketched here is known as Jereys rule Jef a generalization of direct
inference Car
This example shows clearly that general statistical knowledge directly inu	
ences subjective beliefs in specic propositions Assigning degrees of belief on
the basis of statistical information is one important aspect of what we will call
default reasoning about probabilities just as in logical default reasoning eg
McCRei where the inference rules of mathematical logic are augmented
by inference rules that allow to deduce propositions that are usually true or
true by default inferences validated by probability theory are combined with
inferences that are only justied when an assumption of representativeness or
typicality of the situation under consideration is made Like logical default rea	
soning default reasoning about probabilities is defeasible new information added
to a knowledge base from which some inference was made may cause the retrac	
tion of this inference The knowledge base of example  for instance can

be enlarged with POpus  Flying bird   which will certainly invalidate the
inference POpus  Flying bird   drawn earlier
It is necessary to emphasize that default reasoning about probabilities here
is not seen as probabilistic extension of logical default reasoning or as providing
probabilistic semantics for logical default reasoning cf Pea
Also one should be very cautious with equating default reasoning about prob	
abilities with commonsense reasoning about probabilities because it is not at
all certain even that the latter really exists Dierent peoples intuitions about
which consequences to draw from probabilistic information often are greatly at
odds with one another and some of the more widespread beliefs about how prob	
ability works are directly contradicting the rules of probability theory people in
a casino for instance will crowd around a roulette wheel on which a long run
of red numbers has just occured in the expectation that here the probability for
a black number has somehow increased Hence there seem to be few rules of
handling uncertainty that are both common and sensible see KST for a
wealth of material on how statistical information is commonly mis	 interpreted
In this paper we shall not attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of
default reasoning about probabilities even for the restricted domain of reasoning
in terminologies Rather we shall augment probability theory with one additional
reasoning principle 	 cross entropy minimization 	 that generalizing the rule of
direct inference seems to go a long way towards an adequate modelling of that
part of default reasoning about probabilities that links statistical with uncertain
information Thus our basic motivation is very similar to the one in BGHK
BGHK The formalism to be developed however will be quite dierent from
the one proposed by Bacchus et al this one being unsatisfactory for our purpose
because it does not make any provisions for using existing degrees of belief in the
derivation of new ones
Other related work includes that of Paris and Vencovsk a who considering
probabilistic inferences very similar in nature to ours use a dierent semantical
interpretation which too leads them to the minimum cross entropy principle
PV PV
Previous work on probabilistic extensions of concept languages was done by
Heinsohn and Owsnicki	Klewe HOKHei In these works the emphasis is
on computing new conditional probabilities entailed by the given ones Formal
semantics for the interpretation of probabilistic assertions which are the main
contribution of this work are not given

In the following section we shall dene a probabilistic extension for a very
restricted concept language the propositional fragment of ALC In section 
semantical structures for the interpretation of knowledge bases in this language
are dened Section  discusses the problem of computing probability values
resulting from the given semantics Finally in section  we investigate how the
formalism developed so far can be extended to more expressive concept languages

 A probabilistic concept language
For a given nite vocabulary of concept names S
C
 fABC      g and object
names S
O
 fa b c      g we dene a language PCL by the following syntax rules
 Concept terms
i Every concept name is a concept term
ii If C and D are concept terms then C D C D and 	C are concept
terms






 Terminological axioms If A is a concept name and C is a concept term
then
A  C Concept specialization and
A  C Concept denition
are terminological axioms
 Probabilistic terminological axioms If C and D are concept terms and p
is a real number in   then
PCjD  p
is a probabilistic terminological axiom
 Probabilistic assertions If a is an object name C is a concept term and p
is a real number in  then
Pa  C  p
is a probabilistic assertion
A knowledge base KB in PCL consists of a set of terminological axioms
T  a set of probabilistic terminological axioms PT  and a set of probabilistic
assertions P
a
 for every object name a










There is a certain asymmetry in our probabilistic treatment of terminological
axioms on the one hand and assertions on the other While deterministic asser	
tions were completely replaced by probabilistic ones a C has to be expressed
by Pa  C   deterministic terminological axioms were retained and not
identied with 	valued probabilistic axioms which therefore are not allowed
in PT 
There are several reasons for taking this approach First our syntax for prob	
abilistic terminological axioms is very general in that conditional probabilities
for arbitrary pairs of concept terms may be specied Terminological axioms
on the other hand are generally required as in our denition to have only a
concept name on their left hand side Also in order to make the computation
of subsumption with respect to a terminology somewhat more tractable usually
additional conditions are imposed on T eg that it must not contain cycles
that we would not want to have on PT it may be very important for instance
to be able to specify both PCjD and PDjC In essence it can be said that
the non	uniformity of our treatment of deterministic and probabilistic termino	
logical axioms results from our intention to dene a probabilistic extension for
terminological logics that does not aect the scope and e!ciency of standard
terminological reasoning in the given logics
Furthermore it will be seen that even for actual probabilistic reasoning it
proves useful to make use of the deterministic information in T and the proba	
bilistic information in PT in two dierent ways and it would remain to do so if




For T we stay with the standard model	theoretic interpretations used for concept
languages
Such an interpretation is dened as a pair DI where D is a nonempty set
the domain and I is a function that assigns a subset of D to every concept
name For concept languages that allow for binary relations roles to be used
in the formation of concept terms the interpretation I would also have to assign
a binary relation on D to every role name


















IC  D n I
"
C if C  	
"
C
It is obvious then what it means for an interpretation DI to be a model of a
terminological statement where a terminological statement is a generalization of
a terminological axiom by allowing for an arbitrary concpt term on the left	hand
side 
DI j C  D i IC  ID
DI j C  D i IC  ID CD  TS
C
 
A terminological statement  is a logical consequence of T  written T j  i for
every DI j T  DI j 
In case that T j C  D  	D T j C  D  	D for some concept term D
we write T j C   T j C   for short
  for PT
As mentioned in the introduction an axiom of the form PCjD  p shall be
viewed as a specication of a conditional probability As long as we are only
concerned with nite domains we can paraphrase such a conditional probability
by saying either the fraction of elements in D that are also in C is p or an
element randomly selected from D is in C with probability p where in the second
case we assume that every element of D is equally likely to be selected

When we want to allow innite extensions for D as well there is no way to
give such ohand interpretations of a conditional probability Neither can we talk
about a fraction of elements when both D and DC are innite nor is it possible
for countably innite D to select an element of D so that the probability to be
chosen is the same for all elements
Since we do not want to limit ourselves to interpretations over nite domains
we have to take a dierent approach Our interest lying only with subsets of the
domain that can be dened by a concept term we can dispense with probabil	
ity distributions on the domain altogether and instead assign probabilities to
concept terms directly






as the underlying probability space Here TS
C
 is the set of equivalence classes
in TS
C










Hence for every concept term C C  fD  TS
C
 j C  Dg is an element
of TS
C
 The operations   and 	 are dened by performing disjunction
conjunction and negation on representatives of the equivalence classes ie C
D  C  D C D  C D and 	C  	C Finally   A  	A and
  A  	A for some A  S
C
 It is easy to see that   and 	 are well	dened
and that the resulting structure is a boolean algebra
Note that the symbols   	 on the left hand side of these denitions must
formally be distinguished from conjunction disjunction and negation of concept
terms A more exacting treatment of the matter would demand the use of a
dierent set of symbols like t u " for the operations in the boolean algebra
It is convenient however to gloss over this distinction and to informally identify
the two sets of operations Also in the sequel we will not continue to reect the
distinction between C and C in our notation but simply use C for both the
concept term and its equivalence class in AS
C

An atom in a boolean algebra A is an element A such that there is no
A

 fAg with A

 A to be read as an abbreviation for A








       A
n
g are just the concept terms of the form
B
















Every element C of AS
C
 then is in the equivalence class of the nite
disjunction of the atoms A with A  C
On AS
C
 probability measures or synonymously probability distributions
may be dened Recall that   AS
C
    is a probability measure i
   and C D  C # D for all CD with CD The set of
probability measures on AS
C
 is denoted by $AS
C
 Note that   $AS
C
 is
fully specied by the values it takes on the atoms of AS
C

By extending an interpretation DI for T with a probability measure  
$AS
C
 semantics for PT can now be dened
D I  j PCjD  p i C  D  p D 
   for P
a
Finding adequate semantics for probabilistic assertions turns out to be far more
di!cult than it was for probabilistic terminological axioms
While there seem to be few alternatives to interpreting the latter by supplying
in one way or another a probability measure on concept terms there are at
least two fundamentally dierent approaches to giving meaning to probabilistic
assertions
The rst one is the possible	worlds approach taken within a much more gen	
eral framework of probabilistic logic than ours for example in Bac GHK
Here probabilities for assertions like a  C are given through a probability
measure on a set of interpretations possible worlds The probability of a  C
is just the probability of the subset of interpretations that satisfy a  C
We shall take a dierent approach however Rather than modelling the uncer	
tainty expressed in an axiom of the form Pa  C  p by an uncertainty about
which world we are living in we shall view a as a vague object in a given
world in our interpretations a will not be assigned an element of the domain
but a probability distribution 
a
over the concept algebra





This leads to much simpler semantic structures than would be arrived at by
introducing possible worlds semantics at this point because unlike in those not
every single possibility of what a may be in reality is represented but only the

summary probabilistic information about properties of a that can be formulated
in the given language
Interpreting a by a probability measure on the same algebra as used for the
interpretation of the probabilistic terminological axioms enables us to directly
connect the beliefs held about an individual object with what according to our
statistical knowledge encoded in PT  should typically be true for an element of
the domain Such a connection lies at the heart of a formalization of default rea	
soning about probabilities that following the lead of direct inference and Jereys
rule shall now be proposed


  Default reasoning about probabilities and Jereys rule
The approach that is outlined by  is all we would need to provide a PCL	
knowledge base with sound semantics We just might extend a given interpreta	
tion function I to S
O
in this manner and dene
D I  j Pa  C  p i 
a
C  p 
But recall that we set out to do something more than to formulate sound but
unrelated semantics for PT and P
a
 It was our intention to also capture the
interaction between the two kinds of probabilistic statements that takes place in
default reasoning about probabilities
The general information provided by PT may lead us to assign degrees of




What then are the rules governing this reasoning process In the introduc	
tion one such rule has already been used the direct inference principle If our
statistics say that PCjD  p and if all we know about a is Pa  D  q

then
our best guess for Pa  C D is p  q
The direct inference principle lends itself to an immediate generalization to
the case that P
a








j i          ng
 
Note that the letter P in these expressions just stands as an abbreviation for probability
not as a symbol for a specic probability distribution Particularly using the same letter in





















we can complete P
a
to a constraint	set for a partition fC





Let a probability measure  on AS
C














 C j C
i
 
for every concept term C This denition of a probability measure from a prior
distribution  and a set of constraint	values p
i
for a partition of the probability
space is known as Jereys rule Jef
The rationale for using  as a denition for the degree of belief that a belongs
to a certain concept C is the assumption that a is a random element of the domain
about which some partial information has been obtained but which in aspects
that no observation has been made about behaves like a typical representative




While Jereys rule is an immediately appealing formalization for default reason	
ing about probabilities in the presence of disjoint constraints there is no such
simple rule to handle the case of general constraints
Consider for example a knowledge base with
T  
PT  PFlying animaljBird   
PFlying animaljTropical animal   
P
Opus
 POpus  Bird   
POpus  Tropical animal    
The two concepts Bird and Tropical animal are neither disjoint nor does one
subsume the other which would make P
Opus
equivalent to a set of constraints on
disjoint concepts Therefore Jereys rule cannot be applied
How then do we evaluate the probability for Opus being a ying animal
This evaluation should again be based on the assumption that Opus is as un	

exceptional an individual as possible within the limits drawn by P
Opus
 More
precisely the probability distribution 
Opus
we assign to Opus should resemble
the generic probability distribution  that is used in the interpretation of PT as
closely as possible within the set of probability measures that satisfy P
Opus

The notion of resemblance of probability measures obviously needs some
clarication Formally we are looking for a function d that maps every pair  
of probability measures on a given nite probability space to a real number













        x
n









denotes the set of probability measures on a probability space of size n
Given such a d a subset N of $
n
 and a prior distribution  we can then dene










Three requirements are immediate that have to be met by a distance function









 is a singleton








probability measure obtained by Jereys rule applied to  and these con	
straints
We propose to use the cross entropy of two probability measures as the ap	
propriate denition for their distance
Cross entropy also called Kullback	Leibler distance for two probability mea	
sures   

        
n
 and   
























is not dened when either x or y equals  the precondition that all the
components of  and  be strictly positive is usually imposed For our purpose





  for x  and xed y  
 for y   and xed x  








  should not add to the distance


























if for all i  
i




for arbitrary  
Cross entropy often is referred to as a measure of the distance between two
probability measures DZ or a measure of information dissimilarity for two
probability measures Sho These interpretations have to be taken with a
grain of salt however Note in particular that neither is CE symmetric nor does
it satisfy the triangle inequality All that CE has in common with a metric is
positivity
CE   
where equality holds i    Hence property ii holds for CE The following
shows that conditions i and iii with minor qualications accounting for the
possibility of CE being innite are satised as well
Theorem 
  Let   $
n
 let N  $
n
be closed and convex such that
CE   for some   N Then 
CE
N
 is a singleton
Proof See SJ Theorem IV The proof given there for the case of continuous
probability distributions can easily be adapted for the nite probability distribu	
tions we are dealing with  
A constraint set P denes a closed and convex subset of $
n
see section 




 Let N  $
n










the unique element in 
CE
N
 if CE   for some   N
undened otherwise
Theorem 
 Let   $
n
 let N  $
n
be dened by a set of constraints on
disjoint sets such that CE    for some   N Then 
N
 is the
probability measure obtained by applying Jereys rule to  and the constraint	
set
Proof A proof can be found in Wen The theorem can also be obtained as
a corollary to theorem  page   
There are basically two lines of argument that support the use of cross en	
tropy as the appropriate function to be minimized in an updating procedure for
probability measures
The rst one is to appeal directly to cross entropys properties as a measure of
information discrepancy and to argue that an updating procedure should always
choose that posterior distribution that assumes the least amount of additional
information
The second line of argument does not focus on the properties of cross entropy
directly but investigates fundamental requirements for a procedure that updates
a given probability distribution  to a posterior distribution  in a closed and
convex set N Shore and Johnson SJ SJ formulate ve axioms for such a
procedure the rst one being just our uniqueness condition i and prove that





for some function d then d must be equivalent to cross entropy ie must have
the same minima
Paris and Vencovsk a in a similar vein have given an axiomatic justication of
the maximum entropy principle PV which when applied to knowledge bases
expressing the two types of probabilistic statements in a certain way yields the
same results as minimizing cross entropy PV

  Models of KB
With cross entropy as the central tool for the interpretation of P
a
 we can now
give a nal set of denitions for the semantics of PCL
Denition 






j a  S
C
g be a PCL	knowledge base
We dene for   $AS
C

  is consistent with T i T j C   C  %
  is consistent with PT i PCjD  p  PT  C D  p  D%
  is consistent with P
a
i Pa  C  p  P
a
 Cp





  f  $AS
C
 j  is consistent with T g
GenKB  f  $AS
C
 j  is consistent with T and PT g
Bel
a
KB  f  $AS
C
 j  is consistent with T and P
a
g 
When no ambiguities can arise we also write Gen the set of possible generic
measures and Bel
a
the set of possible belief measures for a for short
Denition 





be a vocabulary A PCL	interpretation for S is










and   $AS
C
 Furthermore for all concept terms C with IC    C  
and IaC   a  S
O










j a  S
O
g be a PCL	knowledge base
Let D I  be a PCL	interpretation for the language of KB We dene
D I  j KB D I  is a model of KB i
i DI S
C
j T in the usual sense%
ii   GenKB%












Dening  and Ia as probability distributions on AS
C
 is just one of several
feasible approaches that can be taken Another one keeping somewhat closer to
the usual notion of an interpretation is to dene an extension of a given classical
structure D I by letting  and Ia be probability measures on the subalgebra




 While up to the point reached by denitions
 and  this would be somewhat more economical than the approach actually
chosen by making unnecessary the denition of the Lindenbaum algebra and the
condition in denition  that IC implies C  IaC   it would not
save us anything in the long run because when we want to get an overview of
all possible measures occuring in such models we will be led to representing this
class of probability measures on the various algebras AI by the set of probability
measures they induce on the one algebra AS
C
 via
  $AI  &  $AS
C
 &C  IC 
Therefore apart from the point at which the Lindenbaum algebra AS
C
 and
the sets Gen and Bel are introduced the two approaches are hardly dierent
Particularly they both validate the same set of probabilistic inferences from KB
The following denition provides the necessary notation for probabilistic con	
sequences of KB and completes the set of denitions for the semantics of PCL
Denition 
 Let J   We write
KB j PCjD  J
i for every D I jKB C j D J if D   this is considered true for
every J Also we use the notation
KB j PCjD  J
i KB j PCjD  J and J is the minimal subset of  with this property
Analogously we use KB j Pa  C  J and KB j Pa  C  J
We shall now try to get an overview of the models of our example from the
beginning of this section Since T   we can construct models of KB where all
of the eight atoms of AS
C

	Ta  	B  	Fa	Ta  	B  Fa       Ta  B  Fa

Table  Probability distributions consistent with PT
       


       


       

	




       


       


       


       


       
using convenient abbreviations for the original concept names have nonempty
interpretations
GenKB is the convex hull of the eight distributions listed in table  see
section  for how theses distributions are obtained Every row in this table
represents the probability distribution on AS
C
 that assigns the given probabil	
ities to the atoms specied at the head of the columns where  abbreviates
	Ta  	B  	Fa  abbreviates 	Ta  	B  Fa etc
Bel
Opus
KB is given in table  In these tables as in the remainder of
this paper we distinguish elements of a set of probability measures by dierent
superscripts subscripts being reserved to mark the individual components of one
probability measure There being no occasion to raise a probability measure or
one of its components to a power this should not cause any ambiguities





nor for any convex combination   	

#   	


  	   	  	    	    of these two measures does a distribution
  Bel
Opus
exist with CE   This is because there is no distribution in
Bel
Opus
that has a  in all but the  and  component see theorem  for
a formal statement It stands to reason that generic distributions  that are in
this way incompatible with all the measures in Bel
Opus
cannot be used in models
of KB Otherwise we would have to assign a positive value to some probability
POpus  C for a concept C with C   ie an impossible concept

Table  Probability distributions consistent with P
Opus
       


       


       

	




       


       


       


       


       
For 
	










  i          











Fa   this shows that no
probability greater than  can be deduced from KB for Opus  Flying animal On










POpus  Flying animal   is consistent with KB also What about intermedi	
ate values between  and  Theorem  will show that for all p    there
are models of KB with 
Opus
Fa  p Thus KBjPOpus  Flying animal
The somewhat surprising result in this example then is that no nontrivial
bounds for POpus  Fa can be deduced from the given knowledge base The
reason for this is that our semantics force us to consider all the generic distri	
butions consistent with PT  When PT contains only a very small number of
constraints as it does in our example this is still a very large set of probability
measures and most of the measures in Bel
a
will occur as the CE	projection of
one of the measures in this set In typical applications however it can be ex	
pected that fairly comprehensive information about conditional probabilities of
concepts is available which substantially reduces the space of possible generic
distributions In this case our semantics will always yield quite specic bounds
for probabilities Pa  C whether or not P
a
itself denes strong bounds on 
a

A hard boiled proponent of maximum	entropy methods would probably sug	
gest that we always choose the maximum	entropy distribution from the set Gen
as the one most reasonable hypothesis for the generic distribution  and use this

measure alone in all models of the given knowledge base
While this approach would make sure that every knowledge base determines




 for models of KB thereby tremendously
simplifying and strengthening the probabilistic reasoning that can be carried
out in this framework it would also exhibit rather undesirable properties of
the maximum entropy principle like yielding dierent results when ostensibly
irrelevant information is added to the knowledge base cf PV
As long as it is not for some reason absolutely mandatory to assign unique
probability values to assertions a formalism that only yields intervals of reason	
able generic and belief probabilities and thereby reects the degree of incom	
pleteness of the information in the knowledge base should be preferred to those
that give denite results in all cases but inevitably lead to inferences far more
specic than is warranted by the fragmentary information in KB
For our example the maximum	entropy distribution satisfying PT is

me














Fa    all the numbers in this example as in every numerical
example to follow are rounded
The greater soundness in our reasoning that derives from the cautious ap	
proach of taking into consideration all consistent generic s comes at a high
price Computing J for which KB j Pa  CJ poses a di!cult problem
for which no e!cient solution can be given as yet This problem along with some
other computational aspects of PCL is discussed in the following section

 Computing probabilities
In the last two sections syntax and semantics for PCL have been dened In this
section we shall explore the problem of computing the probabilistic statements
that are entailed by a PCL	knowledge base
There are basically three stages in which the data given in T  PT  and P
a
will be processed and queries be answered First the structural information
in T allows us to reduce the concept algebra AS
C
 to a typically signicantly
smaller algebra which can be used as the underlying probability space in models
of KB This step is explained in section  Secondly the sets Gen and Bel
a
are computed section  This step being accomplished it is easy to check
whether the given knowledge base is consistent ie has any model in the sense
of denition  These rst two stages can be regarded as a preprocessing of the
given data since they are performed independently of the specic queries to be
put to the knowledge base
In a third stage we nally compute the probability values we are interested in
Of the two types of queries 	 PCjD  and Pa  C  	 we wish to provide
an answer for the rst one can be dealt with easily once the preprocessing has
taken place section  A query of the second kind in contrast poses a di!cult
computational problem that is discussed in section 
 The algebra AT 
According to denition  we are dealing with probability distributions on the
concept algebra AS
C
 An explicit representation of any such distribution ie
a complete list of the values it takes on AS
C





tunately we usually will not have to actually handle such large representations
though Since all the probability measures we consider for a specic knowledge




 the relevant probability space for models of KB only
consists of those atoms in AS
C
 whose extensions are not necessarily empty in
models of KB Technically speaking this probability space is a relative algebra
of AS
C
 for which we now provide a formal denition
Denition 










g and a A








































The dierence between a relative algebra and a subalgebra of A should be
noted both kinds of structures are derived from A in a canonical way from a
subset of A In the case of a relative algebra A j a the result is the full local
structure of A at a whereas a subalgebra A

 A is a coarsening of the global
structure of A
The element C AS
C
 by which we relativize AS
C
 is the disjunction of the
atoms not equivalent to  relative to T 
Denition 




AT   fC  AS
C




AT   AS
C
 j CT  AS
C
 relativized by T 
The atoms of AT  then are just the elements of AT  so that jAT  j is the

























AT   fB
















































AT   fB

















for all j i  j  ng
and



















Figure  Algebras AS
C
 and AT  in examples  left and  right
Figure  illustrates the two examples for n   The shaded area is the
elementCT  with respect to which the full algebra AfA

       A
	
g is relativized
Examples  and  show two extreme cases of one very large algebra and one
very small algebra AT  corresponding to terminologies with a very poor and a
very rich structure respectively
It is not di!cult for any given T  to compute a list of the elements of AT 
in such a way that no more than  j AT  j j S
C
j tests for the consistency of a
concept term C with respect to T have to be made
Alternatively AT  could be dened as the Lindenbaum algebra of T  which
is dened just as AS
C













The resulting algebra is isomorphic to AT  as dened in 
 Consistent probability measures and overall consis
tency
The next step in making deductions from a PCL	knowledge base is to compute
GenKB and Bel
a
KB a  S
O

The constraints in PT and P
a
are linear constraints on $AS
C
 When we
change the probability space we consider from AS
C
 to AT  a constraint of the
form PCjD  p is interpreted as
PC  CT jD  CT   p 
Similarly Pa  C  p must be read as Pa  C  CT   p

If j AT  j n then $AT  is represented by $
n
 Each of the constraints
in PT or P
a




KB then is the
intersection of $
n
with all the hyperplanes dened by constraints in PT P
a

Thus if PT P
a
 contains k linear independent constraints GenKB Bel
a
KB


















































































 g that satises the
constraints in PT letting x
i
stand for the probability of A
i








































The result is the line connecting
a         and b        
cf gure 
The constraint in P
a








is given by the four points











Figure  Intersection of $


with two hyperplanes in example 
Having calculated the sets Gen and Bel
a
 a PCL	knowledge base KB can
easily be checked for consistency Following i	iii in denition  we see that
KB is inconsistent i one of the following statements a b and c holds
a T is inconsistent
b GenKB  





 is not dened
Inconsistency that is due to a usually is ruled out by standard restrictions
on T  a T	box that does not contain terminological cycles and in which every
concept name appears at most once on the left hand side of a terminological
axiom always has a model It is trivial to check whether KB is inconsistent for the
reason of GenKB being empty Also KB will be inconsistent if Bel
a
KB  
for some a  S
O
 because in this case 
Bel
a
 is undened for every 
It remains to dispose of the case where GenKB and all Bel
a
KB are
nonempty but c still holds By the denition of 
Bel
a
 this happens i for all
  GenKB there exists a  S
O
such that CE   for all   Bel
a
KB
Since CE  is innite i for some index i 
i
  and 
i
  it is the set of
	components of  and  that we must turn our attention to
Denition 
	 Let   $
n
 Dene




For a polytope M the notation intM is used for the set of interior points of M%
convf

        
k
g stands for the convex hull of 





 The next lemma
is a trivial observation
Lemma 
 Let M  $
n





























#      # 
k
 Then the following are equivalent
i   M   N  CE   
ii Z"  Z
j
 for j          l 
Proof i is equivalent to Z  Z for all  M and all  N which in turn
is equivalent to ii because by lemma  Z" is minimal in fZ j   Mg
and the sets Z
j
 are maximal in fZ j   Ng ie   N j  f        lg
with Z  Z
j
  
By theorem  c is equivalent to
c






" is not dened
and can be tested by a nite number of comparisons of index sets Z
Denition 
 Let KB be a PCL	 knowledge base
Gen
 









is the set of generic measures that actually occur in models of
KB Gen
 
is a convex subset of Gen which if KB is consistent contains at least




  To illustrate the various sources of inconsistency for PCL	 knowl	
edge bases we consider some examples that are all constructed from the following




























































is resolved in the limiting case where A

  
We call KB inconsistent for C i C   in all models of KB Thus KB

is inconsistent for A













   as a consequence which in turn entails A














g is inconsistent As before we have A

   for
all  consistent with PT  In contrast to KB

however there is in KB
	
also an





































  Answering queries PCjD	 

Once an appropriate representation of Gen has been obtained and overall con	
sistency has been ascertained it is not much of an eort to answer queries of the
form PCjD 
Basically all that has to be done is to compute CjD for every vertex 
of Gen The minimal and maximal values thereby obtained delimit the range of
conditional probabilities PCjD that occur in models of KB

Theorem 





        
k
g and suppose thatKB j PCjD  J Then either 
i
D 
 for i          k and J or J is a nonempty interval and
inf J  minf
i
C j D j 
i
D   i          kg 
sup J  maxf
i
C j D j 
i
D   i          kg  
Proof For consistent KB we have Gen
 
KB   and
J  fC j D j   Gen
 
 D  g 





least all the interior points of Gen this is equivalent to 
i
D for i          k
Assume that 
i
D for some i  f        kg Without loss of generality

i
D for i          l and 
i
D for i  l #         k with  l  k
Then D for all the interior points of Gen which means that J is
nonempty
J is an interval   CjD is a continuous function on the connected set
f  Gen
 
j D  g The codomain of a continuous function on a connected
domain is connected% and the connected subsets of R are just the intervals
Furthermore for any polytope M with D   for all  M the function
  CjD attains its maximal minimal values at vertices of M one way to









CjD 	    which is monotone and therefore attains its maximal





Now equations  and  can be proven We give a proof for  in two
steps The proof for  proceeds analogously
First step inf J  minf
i











        
l




CjD j i          lg
because of CjD being minimal on a vertex of convf












D   
 
is not in the convex hull of f
l









        
l
g













CjD j i          lg 
Second step inf J  minf
i

















CjD  J and





 Since every interior point of Gen is an element
of Gen
 











Finally by the continuity of   CjD








Theorem  provides the means only to compute the closure of the interval
we want While this will be quite su!cient in almost every situation it should
be noted that it is not di!cult either to decide whether inf J  J or sup J  J







C j D  inf Jg 
F
inf
is a face of Gen consisting of all the points in Gen on which the conditional
probability of C given D has the constant value inf J Hence inf J  J i  
Gen for some   F
inf





KB a  S
O
 in order to decide whether this is the case Analogously for
sup J
A simple but noteworthy corollary is the following
Corollary 
  Let KB  T 













j a  S
O
g be
two consistent knowledge bases with T  T






let KB j PCjD  J and KB






By corollary  the statistical probabilities that can be derived from a con	
sistent knowledge base are essentially independent from the statements about
subjective beliefs contained in the knowledge base The inuence of the latter
is reduced to possibly removing endpoints from the interval J that would be ob	
tained by considering the given terminological and statistical information only
This is a very reasonable behaviour of the system generally subjective beliefs
held about an individual should not inuence our theory about the quantitative
relations in the world in general If however we assign a strictly positive degree
of belief to an individuals belonging to a set C then this should preclude models
of the world in which C is assigned the probability  ie C is seen as practically
impossible Those are precisely the conditions under which the addition of a set
P
a
to a knowledge base will cause the rejection of measures from the boundary
of Gen for models of KB

 Answering queries Pa  C 

Having dealt with the preliminary problem of computing the sets Gen and Bel
a

which as we have seen comprises a test for the consistency of KB and allows
us to answer queries about conditional probabilities for generic measures we can
now turn to the main issue of this section how to compute the interval J with
KB j Pa  C  J The best solution to this problem would be to determine









 which contains just
those measures that appear as the interpretation 
a
of a in models of KB so that
KB j Pa  C  J for
















 it would therefore be easy to
answer the query Pa  C  for any CTS
C
 Unfortunately such an explicit
description seems to be rather di!cult to obtain so that for the time being we
shall take the approach of doing separate computations for every query Before
we deal with these computations in greater detail in section  we rst show




Before we attempt any computations of J with KB j Pa  C  J we
have to ascertain that this J is indeed an interval There certainly would be

















 J and p

 J held true However we do
not have to worry about such a situation as a corollary to the following theorem
shows
Theorem 
  Let N  $
n








































Then there is an open neighbourhood U of 































































 by the denition of 













 a contradiction  
Corollary 
  Let N  $
n
be convex% let M  $
n





  Let KB j Pa  C  J Then J is an interval





 is connected The function













We have not addressed so far the question of nding for any given  and con	
straints P the distribution  that minimizes CE  among the measures con	
sistent with P Only for the special case of P being a set of constraints on disjoint
concepts we know that  is just the measure obtained by Jereys rule
In general it is not possible to give such a simple closed	form solution Instead
a nonlinear optimization algorithm must be used to compute an approximate
solution There are numerous algorithms available for this problem See Wen

for instance for a C	program based on an algorithm by Fletcher and Reeves








C  An approximation
Finding 
Bel
 for a single measure  seems to be the easier part of the inference
problem we are faced with As it turns out greater di!culties are presented by





we have an eective procedure to approximately compute 
Bel

It has already been mentioned that apparently we cannot hope to compute an





 which in general is not even











C j C  TS
C
g it denes
A nite number of points f












C j i          ngmaxf
i






C An approximate answer to the query Pa  C  therefore









 such that 
inf































C so that for the time being we shall have to settle for the
somewhat unsatisfactory approach of using a search	algorithm based on some
heuristics Such a search might start with elements  of Gen
 
that are themselves
maximal minimal with respect to C and then proceed within Gen
 
in a
direction in which values of 
Bel
a
C have been found to increase decrease










point in the search The search may stop when a certain number of iterations
did not produce any signicant change of these current bounds
Obviously the complexity of such a search depends on the dimension and
the number of vertices of Gen recall that for consistent KB GennGen
 
consists
only of points on the boundary of Gen so that the searchspace Gen
 
basically is
just Gen The cost of a single computation of 
Bel
depends on the size of the
probability space AT  and the number of constraints in P In the following we

show that the search	space Gen
 
can often be reduced to a substantially smaller
space




C only depends on the restrictions of
the measures in Gen
 
and Bel to the probability space generated by C and the
concepts that appear in P
Denition 
 	 Let AfA      g be an algebra not necessarily nite Let A


 and M be such that either
i A

is a subalgebra of A   $A and M  $A or
ii A

is a relative algebra of A with respect to some a A   $A with
a   and M $A with a   for every  M
Then  A





is the set f A

j   Mg





















































































   	y 



























 Let x y be xed and consider the right side of







































































































proves this solution to be indeed a
minimum














 This proves the lemma  
The following theorem has been shown in SJ for probability distributions
with densities As it also plays a vital role in the generalization of PCL to a
probabilistic version of ALC we state it here in a version more suited for the
given context and provide a proof on a somewhat more elementary level than










       A

k









 i          lg
for some p
i


































Figure  illustrates the rst part of the theorem
Proof We rst show that for every   $A 
N

















which proves the rst part of the theorem
Let A  fA

       A
n






junction of some A
i









 is dened Then Z  Z for a suitable  N cf





















Z" Since N is dened by a set of constraints on A

alone every extension of
" to the algebra A is in N For every j  f        kg with "
j
  there exists an
index invj  f        ng with indinvjj and 
invj







  and iinvindi 
i
  otherwise then holds   N
and Z  Z Hence 
N
 is dened
Let   

        
n
  $A such that 
N
 is dened Let
  
N
 "   A

 and "   A

 
Suppose that "  
N A
 
" Since "  N A









  CE" "  






















        
 
n
 is a probability measure in N that extends "
 
 In order to
prove  it remains to show that CE 
 




































































  CE" "  CE 
The last inequality is obtained by applying lemma 














 and  j A

j
 are the same for j          k Thus given  CE 
is minimal for  as dened in 
 
The following example illustrates the use of theorem  for reducing the






























The atoms of the algebra AT  dened by these axioms are

















      
  A
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      
  A

      
  A

      
  A
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  A
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Table  shows the six probability measures whose convex hull is GenKB
which in this example is identical to Gen
 
KB Suppose that we are interested in




































































the probability Pa  A

 The last row in table  shows the probability that is
assigned to A











 and then proceed with various convex
combinations of the 
i
 An exemplary path for such a search is given in table 











not necessarily optimal conclusion in this example is Pa  A
 
     
Notice that the information in P
a
alone allows for the whole range  of prob	
abilities as Pa  A
 
 so that in this case the minimum	cross entropy approach
has indeed resulted in a substantial strengthening of our conclusions
































































is a polytope with only three vertices shown in
table 
By theorem  we know that it is su!cient to determine the range of values


















































   



















































Table  shows the result of a search in Gen

which allows us to arrive at the
same conclusion as above within a shorter time

 Extending probabilistic reasoning to more
expressive languages
The probabilistic concept language PCL we have described so far does not supply
some of the concept	forming operations that are common to standard concept
languages Most notably role quantication was not permitted in PCL In this
section we show how the formalism developed in the previous sections can be
generalized to yield probabilistic extensions for more expressive languages Our
focus here will be on ALC but the results obtained for this language equally
apply to other concept languages
 Role quantication
In ALC the concept	forming operations of section  are augmented by role quan	
tication the vocabulary now contains a nite set S
R
 fr s      g of role names




 A new syntax rule allows for the
construction of concept terms from concept terms and role names
iii If C is a concept term and r  S
R





 denotes the set of concept terms constructible via the rules i	iii
Adding iii to our previous concept	construction rules leaving the rules for
terminological axioms probabilistic terminological axioms and probabilistic as	
sertions unchanged gives us a probabilistic extension ofALC that unsurprisingly
we call PALC Note that probabilistic assertions of the form Pa b  r  p
are not included in our syntax
Role names are interpreted as binary relations over the domain ie the
interpretation function I cf section  assigns a subset of DD to every rS
R

An extension of I to arbitrary concept terms is now given by
IC  fd  D j e  IC

such that d e  Irg if C  r  C

IC  fd  D j e  d e  Ir e  IC

g if C  r  C

in addition to the rules given in  The relations DIj  and T j  for a
terminological statement  are dened as before

 Probabilistic semantics for PALC
Probabilistic information formulated in PALC can often be handled according




 PPenguinjBird  feeds on  Fish   
POpus  Bird  feeds on  Fish  
KB

states that a bird whose food consists exclusively of sh is a penguin with
probability  and that Opus is a bird that meets this description The presence
of role quantication in this example does not present any problem for using direct
inference in order to obtain the estimate POpus  Penguin    Application
of direct inference in this example is particularly simple because KB

is basically
propositional the same information could be expressed by substituting a new
concept name for the term Bird  feeds on  Fish thereby obtaining a simple
PCL	knowledge base Matters are dierent in the following example
KB

 Herring  Fish
Penguin  Bird  feeds on  Herring
PPenguinjBird  feeds on  Herring   
POpus  Bird  feeds on  Fish  
Here feeds on  Fish and feeds on  Herring cannot be simply treated as two
distinct propositional variables because this would mean to ignore the fact that
feeds on  Herring is subsumed by feeds on  Fish ie KB

j feeds on 
Herring  feeds on  Fish This information however enables us to give 
as an estimate for POpus  Penguin since PPenguinjBird  feeds on  Fish
could be any value between  and   PPenguinjBird  feeds on  Herring
We shall now generalize the semantical denitions given in section  to give
semantics to PALC	knowledge bases in such a way that inferences of the kind in
the examples above become sound
Central to our semantics for the language PCL were the concepts of the
Lindenbaum algebra AS
C
 and of the cross entropy of probability distributions
on this algebra
The Lindenbaum algebra for PALC can be dened in precisely the same





quite dierent from AS
C
 however not only is it innite it also is nonatomic
















  for all i














being closed under innite disjunctions it is only of limited interest to consider




 is a countable algebra














  ie a discrete probability measure because
these p
i





The following two examples are meant to give an impression of what proba	




 may look like
Example 
  In this example we construct a probability measure as the limit
























      
Without loss of generality C

  and C

  Let A
i











       C
i








set of its atoms In the i
th



















has been dened In order to dene 
i












































































































 is to let it be induced by a probability measure on the domain D of a











 where D is equipped with a algebra D and a probability
measure 





 is interpreted by an








 I also unambigu	




recall our convention not to




















 at our disposal denition  can now be
repeated almost verbatim for PALC
Denition 








be a vocabulary A PALC	interpretation






















 Furthermore for all concept terms C with IC   
C   and IaC   a  S
O
 must hold For Ia we also write 
a

So things work out rather smoothely up to the point where we have to dene
what it means for a PALC	 interpretation to be a model of a PALC knowl	
edge base In the corresponding denition for PCL denition  cross entropy
played a prominent role When we try to adopt the same denition for PALC





 While we may well dene cross entropy for measures that
are either discrete or given by a density function on some common probability




 do not fall into either of these categories Still in
the two examples at the beginning of this section some kind of minimum cross
entropy reasoning in the special form of direct inference has been employed

See Hal	
 for example for the basic measure theory For countableDDmay be assumed









we only took into account the concept terms mentioned in the knowledge base
in order to arrive at our conclusions about POpus  Penguin The same prin	
ciple will apply for any other more complicated knowledge base when it only
contains the concept terms C

       C
n
 and we want to estimate the probability
for Pa  C
n
 then we only need to consider probability distributions on the




 generated by fC

       C
n
g
The following denition and theorem enables us to recast this principle into



















 be dened by a set of constraints on A



















































 containing the concepts used to dene N
Theorem 






















 i          ng 
Let A

be the nite subalgebra generated by fC

       C
n






















Proof First observe that N A
 







 i          ng  $A
 

because every measure in this set can be extended to a measure in N by a con	
struction along the same lines as in example  see also lemma  below






g for A N and M respectively























for every C A
 











 GenKB and Bel
a
KB are dened for PALC as in denition
 We can now generalize denition  to the language PALC
Denition 






j a  S
O
g be a PALC	knowledge base
Let D I  be a PALC	interpretation for the language of KB We dene






j T in the usual sense
ii   GenKB













Note that denitions   and  are proper extensions of denitions
  and  respectively ie when applied to a PALC knowledge base in a
language without role names the two sets of denitions are equivalent





We now turn to the question of how the semantical denitions given in the pre	
vious section give rise to eective ways of computing the consequences entailed
by a PALC	 knowledge base
Basically the same procedures as for PCL will be used having only to con	




 generated by the concept terms actually
appearing either in the knowledge base or in the queries put to the system we




 in very much the same way as
we did for AS
C

In section  for the most part we assumed all the probability distributions
we worked with to be dened on one common algebra AT  Only in section 
it was noted that we may restrict these distributions to adequate smaller algebras
in order to facillitate the computation of answers to specic queries For PALC
it proves useful to take the more rened approach right from the beginning and




 of consistent probability measures
each on its own appropriate nite algebra For Gen Bel
a
 this will just be the
algebra generated by the concept terms in PT P
a
 relativized by T  For a nite





 the relative algebra MT  is dened as in denition






of M N as the subalgebra generated by the concept terms in PT P
a
 First
we note a lemma that formally states a simple fact a special case of which has










 be dened by











M i          n Then
Gen MT   f  $MT  j C
i
 CT  j D
i
 CT   p
i
 i          ng
where CT  as in denition  Analogously for Bel and Bel NT 
Proof Only the inclusion ' is not completely trivial We must verify that
every   $MT  satisfying the given constraints can be extended to a measure
in Gen First  is extended to the subalgebra M by dening 	CT   
Starting with 

  dened on M we then proceed as in example  In












































 if T j A
ij
  and T j A
ij
  
If T j A
ij
  and T j A
ij
  then T j A
ik





   so that 
i
is well	dened  
When we use representations of Gen and Bel on dierent algebras MT 
and NT  we need to be able to determine what set of probability distribu	
tions is induced on NT  by Gen in order to compute 
 
Bel
 with   Gen
for instance we must have  NT  which is not given directly by a represen	
tation of Gen MT  More generally given Gen MT  we shall have to nd




 Let T be a set of terminological axioms M $MT  We dene
the transformation of M for NT 
TMNT  






   MT   M  NT   g
Specically forMT   NT  TMNT  is the set of all extensions of measures
in M to NT  and for MT   NT  TMNT  is just M NT  We write
TNT  for TfgNT 
In order to determine whether a pair of measures   $MT    $NT 






 it is in fact su!cient to consider
common extensions of  and  to only the nite algebra AMNT  generated




f  $NT  j   $AMNT    MT   M  NT   g






 in the way de	
scribed in the proof of lemma   
Example 
  Consider subalgebras M and N as illustrated in gure  The
structure ofM here is represented by the shapes drawn with solid lines comprising
the four atoms A

       A







 The algebra AMN generated by M and N has the six
atoms C






       and 

        









         
Since 






allows for various extensions to AMN Among them are


           

          

	
           





























Figure  Finite subalgebras in example 
with 

 N      






 N      Thus
f         g  TMN 
Intuitively it seems clear that in fact TMN  conv f     g because
these measures were obtained by extending the vertices of M in extreme ways
to measures on AMN Theorem  below the preparation for which we now
turn to provides a formal result verifying this intuition
Lemma 














NT   	T

NT  #  	T

NT  














Proof The inclusion from right to left is easy to prove
let   	T

NT  #   	T














 MT   
i
i    and
	

 NT  #  	

 NT    

For   	

#   	












 and  NT    Therefore   T	

#   	

NT 











 such that  MT   	

#   	

 and
 NT   












 MT   
i
i 




  holds Then
   NT   	




















 i   % j          n where A

       A
n
are the atoms




























 MT   
i




























































 be nite T a set of terminological axioms
Let Mconvf

        
m
g  $MT  Then
TMNT   convfT
i
NT  j i         mg 
Proof By induction on m For m   the theorem trivially holds Let m  





        
m
g













 	   g
 f	T
m
NT  #  	T
 













NT  j i         mg
by the induction hypothesis
 
Next we show that TNT  is the convex hull of nitely many points and
how these points are obtained from  Following the lead of example  we
rst show that TAMNT  is the convex hull of the extreme extensions
of  to AMNT 
Let fA






       A

k
g be the sets of atoms of MT  and NT 

































hence T j A
i
  a contradiction Let






J  fJ  f        ng  f        kg j i i Ji  Ig 












 if Ji  j
 otherwise

In example  

is J for J           and   
Lemma 
  TAMNT convfJ j J Jg
Proof The inclusion from right to left is trivial every J lies in the convex
set TAMNT 
For the inclusion from left to right let 
 























for all i  f        ng In order to prove that 
 





































for all i j  I 
























Hence "  
 
 which proves   
From TAMNT  it is only a small step to TNT 
TNT   TAMNT  NT 
 convfJ j J Jg NT 











Collecting our results we get
Theorem 




 be nite T a set of terminological ax	
ioms fA






       A

k
g the sets of atoms of MT  and NT  Let
Mconvf

        
m
g  $MT 



















  for all i  f        ng

Note that not every  dened by  for some 
l
and J needs to really be
a vertex of TMNT  Only every vertex of TMNT  is of this form
For future reference we note one more lemma
Lemma 
  Let M N and M as in theorem  Then
intTMNT   TintMNT  





NT   convf
ij
j j          l
i
g i         m 















































 Probabilistic inferences in PALC
In the previous section the relationship between polytopes of probability measures




 has been explored In the
present section we show that all the probabilistic consequences from a PALC
knowledge base can be inferred by only working with such polytopes






j a  S
O
g be a PALC	knowledge base LetM N
a








First we turn to the question of consistency of KB Just as for PCL an
















 is not dened
cf page 
Lemma  tells us that
Gen   i f  $MT  j  consistent with PT g  
so that we can check whether Gen   by only considering probability measures
satisfying the given constraints on the nite algebra MT  in precisely the same
manner as we did for PCL Analogously for Bel
a

By the following theorem testing for an inconsistency caused by c
 
can be
reduced to the nite case treated in theorem 
Theorem 
 	 The following are equivalent







ii With Gen MT   convf

        
k

















Proof By the denition of 
 











T  is not dened







T  is minimal in Gen N
a
T  simultaneously for all a Therefore
given such a 
 

















T  is minimal
with respect to Z in T"N
a
T   
For every a  S
O
 a test for ii in theorem  is now given by theorem 
with MT"N
a






  Let KB be consistent and KB j PCjD  J LetM
CD
be the
algebra generated by M C and D Let
TGen MT M
CD
T   convf







D   for i          k and J or J is an interval and
inf J  minf
i
C j D j 
i
D   i          kg
sup J  maxf
i
C j D j 
i











T  diers from the polytope TGen MT M
CD
T  at most by
points on the boundary of TGen MT M
CD
T  because by the same argu	
ment used in the proof of theorem  every point in intTGen MT M
CD
T 
can be extended to an element of Gen
 
 From this point onwards we can argue
just as in the proof of theorem   
Theorem 









T C  cl J
with N
aC
the algebra generated by N
a
and C



























T   Gen N
aC
T   TGen MT N
aC
T 
this already proves the rst inclusion stated in the theorem For the second
inclusion we show that
TGen MT N
aC





which in conjunction with  yields the desired result because for the contin	
uous function 










holds By an application of lemma  and the fact that every element in





T   TintGen MT N
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which shows  because TGen MT N
aC
T  being a polytope is the same




This section is dedicated to the discussion of an example that demonstrates the
application of the results from sections  and 
The PALC	knowledge base given in table  describes some features of a blocks
world of ornithology and of a penguin Opus who visits the blocks world in order
to select one block as nesting material
The axioms in T are fairly self	explanatory The clauses disjoint are used
to express the disjointness in pairs of the concepts in their argument with a little
more clarity than would be achieved if this was done within the strict syntax
of PALC PT expresses some statistical information about the colours of free
blocks about the ying abilities of birds and about the conditional probability
of an object that is only red to be in fact purely light red
Note that it is impossible to express in PALC that an object has exactly
one colour and that the concept has colour Red is consistent with has colour
	Red because the conjunction of these two just describes objects that do not
have any colour at all
The two objects mentioned in KB are known to be a penguin and a block
respectively The latter one also being a free block with a probability of 
Suppose now that we want to determine the probability p that Opus choice
is a block that is either blue or light red for a block the two concepts has colour
Blue and has colour Red are inconsistent because a block is dened to have at
least one colour and the two concepts Blue and Red are mutually exclusive
Intuitively we may reason as follows a lower bound for the probability p
is obtained by assuming that none of the blocks that are not free are blue or
light red and that all the free blocks that are red are not light red This last

Table  A knowledge base
T  Block  has colour Colour  has position Position
Free block  Block 	 below Block
Blue  Colour
Red  Colour
Light red  Red
Bird   has colour Colour
Flying bird  Bird
Penguin  Bird	Flying bird
disjointBlock Colour Position Bird
disjointBlue Red
PT  Phas colour  RedjFree block   
Phas colour  BluejFree block   
PFlying birdjBird   
Phas colour  Light redjhas colour  Red   
P
Opus
 POpus  Penguin  
P
Opus choice
 POpus choice  Block  
POpus choice  Free block   

possibility has to be taken into account because we do not know whether the
general information Phas colour  Light redjhas colour  Red    also applies
to free blocks Hence the lower bound for p is given by    that is identied
as the probability that Opus choice is a blue free block
An upper bound for p is obtained by assuming conversely that every block
that is not free is either blue or light red and that every red free block is in fact
of a light red In this case p is estimated as the sum of  the probability that
Opus choice  Block  	Free block and    #     
Interpreting the information given in PT cautiously we therefore arrive at
the interval  as a plausible range for p
Being asked for a rather more specic estimate we would probably argue that
a good assumption to make is that
Phas colour  Light redjhas colour  Red  Free block 
Phas colour  Light redjhas colour  Red 
which implies Phas colour  Light redjFree block    and the lower and up	
per bound for p would change to # and #
respectively
We now demonstrate how inferences from KB are made using our semantics
for PALC and the eective procedures outlined in the previous sections
Using the abbreviations BLr for has colour  Blue  Light red and Oc for
Opus choice we have to answer the query
POc  BLr  















is the algebra generated by fBlock Free block BLrg and M is
the algebra generated by the concept terms appearing in PT 
Figure  illustrates both the structure of MT  represented by the shapes
drawn with solid lines and the structure of N
OcBLr
T  represented by shapes
with dotted lines MT  has  atoms fA

       A






T  has  atoms fA

I
       A
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g out of  The atoms of MT 
and N
OcBLr





























Figure  The algebras MT  and N
OcBLr
T 








T  are nonempty
Gen MT  is computed to be a polytope with  vertices and Z" for in	





is an element "

 T"AT  with Z"

































equivalent to the disjoint constraints
POc  Block  	Free block   





















BLr j Block  	Free block #
 
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Table  Consistent atoms of MT  and N
OcBLr
T 






 IIII  V  II  I
 IIIV  VI  I  II
 IIII  V  II
 IIIV  VI  I
 II  I  II
In this example we do not have to rely on a heuristic search in
TGen MT N
OcBLr
T  for elements that maximize or minimize  A prob	
ability measure that maximizes  is obtained as follows we rst look at the




in Gen MT  such that
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choose J J cf page  with
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Checking the vertices of Gen MT  we nd the element


                 








T         





































































































   #       
so that sup J
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and therefore max J

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Hence in the formal framework the same result is obtained as was argued for
intuitively

To conclude the discussion of this example we examine the result of strength	
ening our approach by only looking at the maximum entropy distribution in
Gen MT  which is

me
                  


























































T BLr        #    
    
which slightly diers from the interval  that was received by assuming
 The discrepancy is caused by the somewhat pathological atom
A

 has colour  Blue  has colour  Light red
that causes the maximum entropy approach to prefer a probability distribution
with
Phas colour  Light redjhas colour  Red  	Bird  Free block 
Phas colour  Light redjhas colour  Red  Free block











 was constrained to be  then  would hold for 
me















In this work we presented a probabilistic extension for the terminological knowl	
edge representation language ALC For the resulting language PALC semantics
were dened that model default reasoning about probabilities which takes place
when uncertain information about an object is partially completed by taking it
to be to the greatest possible extent a typical representative of the domain of
discourse
It was shown that for a PALC	 knowledge base consistency can be decided
and the generic conditional probabilities it entails be computed The situation
is more di!cult with respect to the resulting subjective probabilities assigned
to an object Here we have to rely as yet on search algorithms producing a
sequence of intervals converging to the desired interval but about whose rate of
convergence no statement has been made
Further work should be directed towards the question about how the proba	
bility intervals entailed for an object can be computed explicitly or at least be
approximated in such a way that the distance between their endpoints and the
bounds computed so far is known to substantially decrease with each iteration
Another open problem that will have to be addressed is to clarify the relation
between the semantic modeling as developed in this work and the possible	worlds
approach taken in Bac Bac GHK
Finally quite generally it is desirable to further improve our insight into the
nature of the probability measures dened by minimizing cross entropy and their
adequacy for modeling default reasoning about probabilities

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